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ISSUES BEFORE THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
H. Gary Knight*
In 1974 the international community of nations will convene in
Caracas, Venezuela, to rewrite substantial portions of the international law of the sea. This article describes the events which led to
this conference and identifies the major issues which will be dealt
with there.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

History of the Law of Ocean Space

The world ocean covers some seventy per cent of the surface of
the Earth and, besides serving as a medium for the exchange of
commodities, is the repository of substantial food and energy resources.' Initially, the ocean was used primarily for transportation of
people and goods, and the exploitation of fishery resources situated
relatively near to the major land masses. With the development of
appropriate technologies, the range of uses of the ocean has now
expanded to include the exploitation of non-living resources, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, military use, the dumping of
waste products from upland areas, recreation, and scientific research
leading to the expansion of knowledge about the planet and the enhanced use of other resources.
* Associate Professor of Law and Marine Sciences, and holder of the Campanile
Charities Professorship of Marine Resources Law, Louisiana State University Law
Center; Program Coordinator, L.S.U. Sea Grant Legal Program; Member, Advisory
Committee on the Law of the Sea (National Security Council Inter-Agency Task Force
on Law of the Sea.)
The research for this article was supported partially by funds allocated by Campanile Charities, Inc. for the Campanile Charities Professorship of Marine Resources
Law, and partially by funds from the Louisiana State University Sea Grant Program,
a part of the National Sea Grant Program (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce), under Grant No. 2-35231. The United States
Government is authorized to produce and distribute reprints hereof for governmental
purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation that may appear hereon.
All of the comments made in this article are my own personal views and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government. Further, nothing contained in this article was imparted to me exclusively in connection with my service on
the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, and all comments are based on
publicly available information.
1. For a collection of articles concerning the physical properties of the ocean and
its resources, see THE OCEAN (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1969).
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It is not surprising to find that as both the diversity and intensity
of these uses of ocean space increased during the Nineteenth and
Twentieth centuries, many conflicts occurred between nations and
between users of the marine environment. Most of these disputes
were resolved on the basis of the doctrine of "freedom of the seas,"
the fundamental principle governing the use of ocean space which
emerged during the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth centuries from the competitive struggle among European nations for access
to the lands and resources of the newly discovered continents of North
and South America, Africa, and Asia. 2 This principle, articulated by
the Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius in 1509 and which posited that no
nation could validly subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty, was based on the dual premises that the resources of the seas
were inexhaustible at the then current rate of demand and that it was
not possible for nations or individuals to appropriate areas of the seas
to their exclusive control.' Certainly with respect to transportation of
goods by sea the principle of freedom of the seas was a desirable one
which retains much merit even to the present time. However, with
respect to the exploitation of the living and non-living resources of the
sea, it soon became apparent that increased demand for resources
would result in congestion of effort and depletion of physical and
economic return unless some basis of regulatory jurisdiction were
established.4 Further, national economic and military security interests dictated that some area of the ocean immediately surrounding
the land masses be placed under the absolute or near absolute jurisdiction of the coastal state. From the Seventeenth century to the
present, these and other economic and security factors have resulted
in the development of a number of concepts which modify the general
rule of freedom of the seas. Security interests resulted in international
acceptance of the concept of the territorial sea - a relatively narrow
band of ocean adjacent to a nation's coast over which it has nearly
absolute territorial jurisdiction. 5 Economic considerations prompted
development of the concept of the continental shelf which allocates
to the coastal state the exclusive right to exploit the oil, gas, and
2. On the emergence of the doctrine, see T.
(1911); P.
(1924).

FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA
POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA IN HISTORY, LAW AND POLITICS, chs. II-V

3. H. GROTIUS,

MARE LIRERUM ch. V (R. Magoffin transl., 1916).
4. See Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas, 8
(1968).

5. On the origin of the concept of the territorial sea, see S.

NAT.

RES. J. 424

SWARZTRAUBER, THE

THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS (1972); Fenn, Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 465 (1926).
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other mineral resources located in the seabed and subsoil adjacent to
its coast., The same economic considerations permitted some limited
extension of the reach of exclusive national jurisdiction with respect
to the exploitation of living marine resources.7
From time to time other problems have resulted in the temporary
creation of special zones of jurisdiction adjacent to coastal states.
Examples include neutrality zones in time of war; military identification zones in time of peace; zones to facilitate the enforcement of
customs, fiscal, health, and immigration laws; zones whose purpose
is to protect the coastal and marine environment; and zones to protect against unwarranted intrusions into or effects upon the national
economic or social fabric.'
Until the middle of the Twentieth century, the use of the sea was
generally governed by customary international law principles with
occasional multilateral treaties defining the special interest of affected states. It was not until 1958 that there was a successful and
meaningful general codification of some principles of the law of the
sea.
B.

The 1958 and 1960 United Nations Conferences on the Law of the
Sea

In 1958 the United Nations sponsored the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea which produced four major international agreements concerning the use of ocean space.' The Convention on the High Seas' ° codified the concept of freedom of the seas
but also introduced a reasonableness test as a means for resolving
disputes where congestion or conflicts of interest occur. That Convention also contained detailed provisions concerning navigation of ships
on the high seas and proscriptive and enforcement jurisdiction with
6. On the origin of the concept of the continental shelf, see Z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (1968); Cosford, The Continental Shelf
1910-1945, 4 MCGIL L.J. 245 (1958); Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas,
27 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 376 (1950).
7. On the origin of the concept of exclusive fishery zones, see P. FENN, THE ORIGIN
OF THE RIGHT OF FISHERY IN TERRITORIAL WATERS (1926); Teclaff, Jurisdiction Over
Offshore Fisheries-HowFar Into the High Seas, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 409 (1967).
8. See generally, Dickinson, Jurisdictionat the Maritime Frontier, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1926); Oda, The Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 11 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 131
(1962).
9. See Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958); Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 234 (1959).
10. Convention on the High Seas (done April 29, 1959, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962),
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, in force Sept. 30, 1962).
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respect thereto. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone" failed to specify an agreed maximum breadth of the
territorial sea but did establish rules concerning the location of the
baseline from which offshore zones are measured as well as rules
governing the right of innocent passage of vessels navigating in territorial waters. The Convention on the Continental Shelf 2 accorded
exclusive rights to coastal states for the purpose of exploiting the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to their coasts.
Finally, the Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 3 provided a mechanism for alleviating
conflicts between the interests of coastal states in the living resources
off their coasts and the interests of distant water fishing states in
exploiting those same stocks of resources.
The unresolved questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and
the precise nature of the rights of coastal states with respect to living
resources off their coasts were again dealt with in 1960 during the
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.' 4 However,
no agreements emanated from that meeting, with the final compromise on a six mile territorial sea, an additional six mile exclusive
fishing zone, and a system for phasing out distant water fishing in the
extended fishing zone falling one vote short of the required two-thirds
majority.
Because of the failure of the First and Second Conferences to
produce solutions to the critical questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and the nature of fishing rights in coastal areas, and because of the advance of technology in other areas of ocean space use,
problems and conflicts concerning the exploitation of ocean resources
and the use of ocean space continued during the 1960's in increasing
frequency.
C.

Problems with the Existing Law of the Sea
By way of illustrating the need for further consideration of the

11. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (done April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606 (1964), T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, in force Sept. 10,
1964).
12. Convention on the Continental Shelf (done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, in force June 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as
Convention on the Continental Shelf].
13. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas (done April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138 (1966), T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285,
in force March 20, 1966).
14. See Bowett, The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 9
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 415 (1960); Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1960).
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law of the sea, a few selected examples of serious problems concerning
the use of ocean space will be briefly identified here.
First, with the development of sophisticated technology for the
exploitation of petroleum and natural gas resources from the continental shelf, a question arose concerning the seaward extent of
coastal state jurisdiction over such resources. The Convention on the
Continental Shelf was subject to varying interpretations on the question, 5 and concern developed whether coastal state jurisdiction could
extend to mid-ocean or whether at some point the international community at large, operating through an international agency, should
possess rights to extract non-living resources from the seabed and the
subsoil.
Second, stocks of certain species of fish were being seriously depleted as a result of intensified catch efforts coupled with the "open
access" character of the high seas. Further, some coastal state fishery
enterprises such as those of the United States were faced with increasingly difficult competitive efforts from well financed and technologically superior distant water fishing states such as the Soviet
Union, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The combination of stock
depletion, potential economic deprivation, and other factors resulted
in a number of conflicts involving fishing vessels, some of which escalated to violence.' 6
Third, the economic feasibility of mining metal bearing nodules
from the seabed necessitated the development of some legal regime
to govern their exploitation where the continental shelf jurisdiction
of the coastal state terminated (an issue partially related to the question of the seaward extent of the continental shelf). Some felt that
these mineral resources should be exploited for the benefit of all
mankind, while many coastal states wished to protect whatever economic interests they might have in such resources near their coasts.
15. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, article 1, provides that the term
"continental shelf" refers to: "[Tihe seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas." (Emphasis added.) On the
question of the seaward extent of the legal continental shelf, see Brown, The Outer
Limit of the ContinentalShelf, 13 JURID. REv. (N.S.) 111 (1968).
16. See, e.g., T. Wolff, Peruvian-United States Relations over Maritime Fishing
(Occasional Paper No. 4, Law of the Sea Institute, March 1970); Azzam, Dispute
Between Franceand Brazil over Lobster Fishing in the Atlantic, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 1453 (1964); Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 Wisc. L. REv. 37
(1973).
17. See, e.g., Bowett, Deep Sea-Bed Resources: A Major Challenge, 31 CAMBRIDGE
L. J. 50 (1972); Laylin, Past, Present and Future Development of the Customary
InternationalLaw of the Sea and the Deep Seabed, 5 THE INT'L LAWYER 442 (1971).
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Fourth, the international legal concept of innocent passage, by
which both merchant and military vessels navigate in the territorial
waters of states other than the flag which they fly, began to present
some difficult problems of application. Some states wished to more
comprehensively regulate the passage of foreign vessels for purposes
of environmental protection and national security, while the major
maritime powers generally opposed the imposition of any additional
burdens on navigation."
D.

The Maltese Initiative-1967

The initiative toward reconsidering the law of the sea was taken
by the permanent mission of Malta to the United Nations when it
introduced to the United Nations General Assembly agenda in 1967
the question of the regime to govern exploitation of the non-living
resources of the seabed and subsoil beneath the high seas beyond the
limits of national-jurisdiction.' In response to debate on that agenda
item the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2340 (XXII) which
created the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee. 0 In these deliberationswhich by and large caught the major maritime powers by surprise
-it became very clear that the majority of the nations of the world
wished to expand the agenda to include all uses of ocean space
and that they would be unsatisfied to limit it strictly to the so-called
"seabed question" which was concerned with the regime to govern
nonliving resource extraction on the deep ocean floor. At this point,
then, the deliberations gradually began to blend into negotiations
which would ultimately lead to a new law of the sea conference.

II.
A.

PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS,

1967-1973

The Seabed Committee

In December, 1968, the General Assembly, acting on the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee, adopted Resolution
18. See Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Passage Through International Straits, 51 ORE. L. REv. 759 (1972);
Comment, 3 CALIF. WEST. INT'L L. J. 375 (1973).
19. U.N. Doc. A/6695, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7R
(1967). See also the statement of Ambassador Pardo before the First Committee,
United Nations General Assembly, on November 1, 1967, elaborating on his concepts
[U.N. Doc. A/C.1IPV.1515 and A/C.1/PV.1516, also reprinted in Interim Report on the
United Nations and the Issue of Deep Ocean Resources, at 267].
20. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII) (1967); 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 174 (1968). See
Goldberg, U.N. EstablishesAd Hoc Committee to Study Use of Ocean Floor, 58 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 125 (1968).
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2467 (XXIII) (1968) which created the permanent United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction ("Seabed Committee"
hereinafter)." During 1969 and 1970 the Seabed Committee met
semi-annually to deliberate the issue. Three important resolutions
were adopted by the General Assembly as a result of these meetings.
In December, 1969, the "moratorium" resolution was passed. It declared that, pending the establishment of an international seabed
regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to
refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the
area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall
be recognized. 2
This resolution was opposed by all but two technologically developed
nations, but clearly expressed the intent of the majority that seabed
resources were to be subject to international, not national, regulation.
In December 1970, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
2750-C (XXV) (1970) - the "principles" resolution - which represented a consensus of opinion on the basic features of a seabed regime. The first four operative paragraphs provide that:
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to
as the area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common
heritage of mankind.
2. The areas shall not be subject to appropriation by any
means by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State
shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any
part thereof.
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources
incompatible with the international regime to be established and
the principles of this Declaration.
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation
21. G.A. Res. 2467 (XXIII) (1968); 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 201 (1969). The
Seabed Committee consisted originally of 42 nations, but membership was expanded
to 86 in December, 1970 [G.A. Res. 2750-C (XXV) (1970), operative para. 5] and to
91 (including the People's Republic of China) in 1971 [G.A. Res. 2881 (XXVI) (1971),
operative para. 3].
22. G. A. Res. 2574-D (XXIV) (1969), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 422 (1970).
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of the resources of the area and other related activities shall be
governed by the international regime to be established. 3
The adoption of the "principles" resolution represented a giant step
forward in the negotiations since the Seabed Committee could now,
at least in theory, turn to the more specific task of hammering out
hard texts of agreements concerning the seabed question. In recognition of this plateau of achievement, Resolution 2750-C (XXV) (1970)
- the "conference" resolution -

was also adopted. This resolution-

called for the convocation in 1973 of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ("Third Conference" hereinafter) and
constituted the Seabed Committee as a preparatory group with instructions to develop draft treaty articles on the seabed issue as well
as a comprehensive list of subjects and issues related to the law of
the sea to be dealt with by the Third Conference.24 During 1971 and
1972 the Seabed Committee continued to meet in preparatory sessions. Following each year's meetings, appropriate resolutions were
adopted by the General Assembly instructing the Secretariat to provide certain types of25 information or special studies for the use of the
Seabed Committee.

B.

The Third Conference

At its 1972 meeting, the General Assembly, acting on the authority of Resolution 2750-C, requested the Seabed Committee to hold
two further preparatory sessions in 1973, the year originally scheduled
for the initiation of the substantive law of the sea conference." Resolution 3029-A also requested the Secretary General to convene the
first session of the Third Conference for a period of two weeks in
November-December, 1973, "for the purpose of dealing with organizational matters," and called for a second session of the conference
"for the purpose of dealing with substantive work" to be convened at
Santiago, Chile, for a period of eight weeks in April-May, 1974. The
resolution expressed the expectation that the Third Conference would
be concluded during 1974 or at a subsequent session or sessions no
23. G. A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 220 (1971), adopted
by 108 votes to none with 14 abstentions. In spite of the overwhelming support for
Resolution 2749 in the voting, its value as evidence of customary international law is
greatly reduced by the compromise nature of most of its operative provisions.
24. G. A. Res. 2750-C (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 226 (1971).
25. See, e.g., G. A. Res. 3029-B and 3029-C (XXVII) (1972) which requested
comparative studies of the extent and economic significance for the international area
and for riparian states of various proposals for limits of national jurisdiction over
seabed resources.
26. G.A. Res. 3029-A (XXVII) (1972), 12 I1T'L LEGAL MATERIALS 223, 224 (1973).

19741

LAW OF THE SEA

later than 1975, and observed that the government of Austria had
offered Vienna as a site for 1975 should that additional time be required.
The procedural meeting was held in New York from December 3
to December 14, 1973. As a result of the coup d'etat in Chile, the site
for the substantive meeting was changed to Caracas, Venezuala, and
the dates of June 20-August 29, 1974, subsequently established for the
meeting."
C.

The Agenda

As noted above, the issue resulting in creation of the Seabed
Committee was the regime to govern the extraction of non-living
resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
However, it became obvious from an early date that many states
wished to open other areas of the law of the sea for negotiation and
for inclusion in the Third Conference agenda. Although there was
some substantial difference of opinion concerning the appropriate
scope of the agenda, the "conference" resolution of December 17,
1970, included a specification that the Third Conference deal with,
in addition to the seabed question:
[A] broad range of related issues including those concerning
the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial
sea (including the question of its breadth and the question of
international straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas (including the question of the preferential rights of coastal states), the preservation
of the marine environment (including, inter alia, the prevention
of pollution) and scientific research.28
At its July-August, 1972, meeting the Seabed Committee reached
agreement on a full agenda. A copy of that agenda is appended to this
article as annex A.
D.

The Players

The 91 members of the Seabed Committee as well as the full
complement of nations which will assemble during the Third Conference reflect a diversity of economic, technological, military, social,
and other aspects of national life. A number of these distinctions

27. G. A. Res. 3067 (XXVIII) (1973).
28. G. A. Res. 2750-C, note 24 supra.
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between groups of nations have profound consequences for national
positions on law of the sea and the effort with which those positions
are presented.
Among the more important classifications of nations in this regard are:
(1) Technologically developed nations and developing nations,
especially with regard to ability to exploit and use ocean resources.
(2) Military powers and non-military powers.
(3) Maritime powers and non-maritime powers.
(4) Coastal states and land-locked states (one can also include
"shelf-locked" states, i.e., states with continental shelves which must
be shared with adjacent neighbors).
(5) States with long coastlines and states with minimum sea
contact.
(6) States with resource rich continental shelves and those with
resource poor offshore areas.
(7) Archipelago states and normal coastal states.
(8) States situated astride straits used for international navigation and states possessing a substantial merchant marine or which
are heavily dependent on ocean borne commerce.
(9) States with strong coastal fishing industries and states with
strong distant water fishing capabilities.
This list is incomplete, but should give some idea of the multitude of interests involved in the negotiations. 9 As if this were not
enough complexity, however, many states have further diversity of
interests within their own national policy making structures. For example, in the United States, there are quite different perspectives
concerning oceans policy held by the Department of Defense, the
petroleum industry, the fishing industry, hard mineral mining industries, scientific research institutions, and those concerned with protection of the marine environment. Even within a single national
industry such as fisheries there are often different viewpoints on law
of the sea matters - such being the case among the tuna, shrimp,
salmon, and coastal fishing industries in the United States.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BEFORE THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

As noted above, the agenda for the Third Conference is extremely broad, covering virtually every use and resource of the ocean.
29. For further discussion of the various groupings of nations and their interests
in and impacts on the negotiations, see Alexander, Indices of National Interest in the
Oceans, 1 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 21 (1973).
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There are, however, five basic issues of overriding importance which
will be considered and I have thus limited this article to the identification and discussion of these critical subject matter areas.
In an article of the broad scope yet restricted length such as this
one, it is not possible to set forth with comprehensiveness all of the
positions taken by each country or even each group of countries with
respect to each of the issues considered. Because many of the splits
of opinion tend to form along a north-south line-i.e., between industrially developed countries and the developing nations - I have chosen in many instances to utilize the proposal set forth by the United
States as being fairly representative of the developed- nations' position and have then selected only one from among many proposals set
forth by developing nations to indicate the general trend of contrary
thinking.
Finally, in considering the various issues, positions, and possible
outcomes, the reader should bear in mind the tension between the
concept of freedom of the high seas in its absolute form and the
concept of property rights and regulatory authority in the oceans.
Events of the past fifty to one hundred years indicate a clear trend
in most instances away from the former and toward the latter. Of
critical importance, however, is the nature of the property right, jurisdictional base, regulatory authority, or other grant of power with
respect to the various uses of ocean space. As will be noted subsequently, the form of the regulatory power can often have as much
significance as the substantive rules imposed pursuant thereto.
A.

Non-Living Resources

The seabed question, and thus the current law of the sea negotiations leading to the Third Conference, had its genesis in a consideration of the regime to govern the extraction of non-living resources
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. There are two fundamental
issues to be resolved with respect to such non-living resources: (1) the
seaward extent of national jurisdiction, and (2) the regime to govern
the exploration for and exploitation of non-living resources both
within and beyond national jurisdiction.
1.

Within National Jurisdiction
a. Limits
Of obvious importance is the determination of the boundary
between national jurisdiction and an international seabed area, for
this will effect an allocation of wealth between the coastal states and
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the international community as a whole. As noted above, 0 the present law concerning the seaward extent of national jurisdiction over
non-living resources contained in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf is open ended, thus inviting either unilateral state action or
international agreement in order to develop a generally acceptable
resolution of the problem of indefiniteness. Much debate has taken
place concerning the proper interpretation of the so-called "exploitability" clause of Article 1 of the Convention, and it is far from clear
precisely what seaward limits were contemplated by the term "adja-

cent. 13
Early in the negotiations, many less developed countries, stimulated by predictions of vast riches to be secured from exploitation of
seabed resources, expressed favor with very narrow national limits
thus placing significant economic resources within international jurisdiction. The rationale of this approach was that such resources
(and the revenues derived therefrom) would be the common heritage
of mankind and could thus be applied to the special needs of developing countries or otherwise equitably distributed. 32 As the negotiations
progressed, however, it became clear that the earlier predictions of
vast wealth waiting for the taking from the seabed were overstated
or based on incomplete data. In fact, the only resources of value in
the non-living category currently being exploited in any significant
economic amount from the ocean are petroleum and natural gas, and
these exploitation activities are still being carried on in relatively
shallow waters, in all cases less than 200 meters.
Two basic approaches emerged as viable alternatives to the politically unacceptable concept of narrow limits of national jurisdiction.
The first of these - the intermediate zone concept - was put forward
by the United States in its draft seabed treaty submitted to the
Seabed Committee in 1970.31 The United States envisioned a three
tier jurisdictional approach in which national jurisdiction over nonliving resources would be exclusive from the coastline to the 200
meter isobath; from the 200 meter isobath to the edge of the continen30. See note 15 supra.
31. See, e.g., Goldie, The Exploitability Test - Interpretationof Potentialities,
8 NATURAL REs. J. 434 (1968); Goldie, A Lexicographical Controversy - the Word
"Adjacent" in Article I of the Continental Shelf Convention, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 829
(1972).
32. For a statistical survey of various boundary options and their effects on resources allocation, see Hodgson and McIntyre, National Seabed Boundary Options,
mimeographed, 1972 (Dep't of State).
33. Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/25 (1970), 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046 (1970).
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tal margin there would be a "trusteeship area" which would be international in juridical character but the resources of which would be
exploited subject to the administration of the coastal state; and beyond the limit of the continental margin there would exist a purely
international area to be administered by a new international agency.
Although there was limited support for this concept, the United
States continued to maintain it as an official position until late 1972.
The other alternative, which began to emerge in 1971 and 1972,
is that of the economic resource zone. Under this proposal national
jurisdiction over both living and non-living resources would extend to
significant distances from the coast - 200 miles being a popular
suggestion - and a purely international area would exist beyond the
limit of national jurisdiction. This proposal was considered quite appealing by many less developed countries who now perceived that
their short term economic interest might be best served by ensuring
continued jurisdiction over the presently exploitable petroleum and
natural gas resources of the continental shelf rather than taking a
chance on sharing future revenues to be generated from the exploitation of resources located beneath deeper waters. The texts illustrating
areas of agreement and disagreement concerning the seabed question
prepared for the Third Conference by Sub-Committee I of the Seabed
Committee34 provide some indications of the nature of the limits
likely to be agreed upon. The alternatives presented are: (1) the outer
limit of the continental shelf or 100 nautical miles, whichever is farther seaward; (2) a fixed but unspecified mileage from the coastline;
margin or 200 nautical
(3) the outer lower edge of the continental
35
miles, whichever is farther seaward.
The question of limits is also affected by existing international
law concerning the seaward extent of national resource jurisdiction
in the ocean. The Convention on the Continental Shelf specifies that
the exclusive resource jurisdiction of the coastal state extends to the
200 meter isobath or, beyond that limit, "to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the said areas."3 It has thus been generally agreed that coastal
states presently have a vested right to at least the 200 meter isobath.
Subject to more debate among both politicians and scholars, however, is the question of the nature of coastal state rights between the
200 meter isobath and the edge of the continental margin.
34. Report of Sub-Committee I, Annex III: Texts Illustrating Areas of Agreement
and Disagreement on Items 1and 2 of the Sub-Committee's Programme of Work, U.N.
Doc. A/AC. 138/94/ADD.1 (1973).

35. Id. at 2-3.
36. Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, note 12 supra.
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One school of thought holds that since this area is subject to
coastal state jurisdiction conditioned only on compliance with the
"admits of the exploitation" test of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the resources of the area are in fact presently vested in the
coastal state. Proponents of this theory argue, then, that no nation
should give up to an international organization or agency rights to
which it presently has access.3 7 The contrary view is that the rights
beyond the 200 meter isobath vest only upon actual occurrenceof the
condition precedent, namely the exploitation of the natural resources
of the area, and that since there has been no such exploitation these
rights are inchoate at best.:8
Thus some states supporting the economic resource zone concept
argue that to the extent that the continental margin extends beyond
200 miles they have a vested interest in this area and it must be
included in any economic resource zone agreed upon at the Third
Conference. At the present time, it seems extremely likely that some
form of the economic resource zone concept will be adopted and that
the seaward limit of national jurisdiction will be fixed - in maximum
- at a 200 mile or edge of the continental margin figure.
b.

Regime

Incorporated within the economic resource zone concept is
the notion that the coastal state would have exclusive authority to
establish whatever rules and regulations concerning disposition of
resources under its jurisdiction which it chose. The existing law of the
continental shelf accords the coastal state exclusive sovereign rights
to explore for and exploit the non-living resources (and sedentary
species of living resources) of the seabed and subsoil in the area
subject to national jurisdiction."9 The economic resource zone concept
would thus work no significant change in this legal structure.
The major issue concerns the extent to which international standards or other external regulations or authorities will be made applicable to this essentially national zone of resource jurisdiction. The
United States has, for example, made very firm its position that it
can only accept broad national resource jurisdiction if there are inter37. See, e.g., Ely, Deep Sea Minerals and American NationalInterests, THE LAW
OF THE SEA: INTERNATIONAL RULES AND ORGANIZATION FOR THE SEA 423 (L. Alexander ed.
1969); and NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN

FLOOR

(1969).

38. See, e.g., Knight, Dissenting Statement to the Report of the MarineResources
Committee of the Section of Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association
on the Proposed Seabeds Treaty, 5 NAT. RES. LAWYER 154 (1972).
39. Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 2, note 12 supra.
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national standards imposed on the area in five respects, viz.:
prevention of unreasonable interference with other uses of the ocean
as the result of the exercise of resource jurisdiction by the coastal
state (directed principally at navigational rights); protection of the
ocean from pollution; protection of the integrity of investment; sharing of revenues derived from seabed exploitation for international
community purposes; and a system of peaceful and compulsory settlement of disputes. 0
This approach is generally supported by the major maritime
powers who feel that the resource jurisdiction to be accorded to
coastal states under a resource zone concept might extend to unreasonable interferences with both military and commercial navigation.
This issue will be discussed in further detail in the section of the
article concerning territorial sea breadth and navigation, as well as
the section dealing with pollution, and will therefore not be pursued
further here. Suffice it to note that there is a conflict of position
between the major maritime powers and the less developed coastal
states over the precise nature of the jurisdiction to be accorded to the
coastal state and the international standards, if any, to be made
applicable to the area under national jurisdiction.
2.

Beyond National Jurisdiction

There are two basic issues involved in the negotiations concerning the non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil located beyond
ultimately agreed bounds of national jurisdiction. The first relates to
the composition of the international organization which will have
administrative responsibility with respect to the conservation and
development of the resources, and the second concerns the substantive rules which will be applicable to marine mining activities.
Two preliminary comments are in order at this point. First, the
only resources to which the regime and the authority would appear
to be applicable in the short to intermediate term are manganese
nodules. Several different industrial enterprises have indicated that
they are prepared at the present time to begin prospecting activities
as a prelude to commercial exploitation of the metals contained in
manganese nodules and are thus actively pressing for the adoption of
regimes in the immediate future to govern the extraction of such
40. See Statement of John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August
10, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SR.77-89 at 63 (1972). See also United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of States in the Coastal

Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.35 (1973).
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resources, whether at the national or the international level." In the
longer term, however, fossil fuel deposits may well be exploited from
beyond the continental shelves as evidenced by a recent study conducted by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution."
Second, there is a substantial scholarly debate concerning
whether the non-living resources of the seabed beyond limits of national jurisdiction are res nullius - i.e., the property of no one, title
vesting in him who first reduces the resources to his possession - or
whether such resources are the "common heritage of mankind" and,
if so, what the juridical content of that phrase is. It seems fairly clear
that prior to adoption of General Assembly Resolution 274911 such
resources would have been regarded as res nullius in the same manner
as fish swimming in the high seas. Resolution 2749, however, indicates a contrary expectation on the part of the vast majority of the
international community. Unfortunately, the classification of these
resources as the "common heritage of mankind" does little to clarify
the legal status of the manganese nodules and other seabed resources,
for there are as many interpretations of the phrase as there are interpreters." The direction of the future is obviously toward some form
of international control which will fit the "common heritage" concept. Before the establishment of the new regime, however, the legal
debate is not likely to be settled.
a.

Machinery

The basic issue is the internal structure of the new international agency to be charged with the responsibility for allocating
exploitation rights and regulating exploitation activities with respect
to non-living resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. The negotiations to date have progressed on the basis
that the organization will be similar to already existing specialized
agencies of the United Nations, at least to the extent that they possess two separate organs with administrative responsibilities - an
41. See, e.g., testimony of John E. Flipse, President, Deepsea Ventures, Inc. in
Hearings on Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources (H.R. 13076) before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 32, 9, 13 (1972).
42. Report No. 3196 of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution; see also OCEAN
SCIENCE NEWS, Oct. 26, 1973, at 3.
43. Note 23 supra.

44. See, e.g., Anand, Equitable Use and Sharing of the Common Heritage of
Mankind, THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 70 (L.
Alexander ed. 1973); Gorove, The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A
Political, Moral, or Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 390 (1972).
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assembly and a council. Assemblies are generally one nation-one vote
policy making organs, while councils are generally more restricted in
membership and are charged with operational functions. A substantial conflict of views exists with respect to the powers and functions
to be accorded to these respective organs.
The less developed countries favor a strong policy making and
operations role for an assembly in which all nations would have equal
participation. This view appears to be motivated as much by preoccupation with political participation in the agency as with the economic efficiency of operations. The technologically more developed
nations tend to favor placing policy making powers almost exclusively in a council which would be so structured as to ensure balanced
participation between the developed and developing countries, while
excluding no group from participation thereon. The United States
proposal, for example, envisions a twenty-four member council divided into two sections, the first consisting of the six most industrialized nations based on gross national product figures and the second
consisting of 18 developing countries including representatives of
landlocked states and other geographically disadvantaged states. In
order to take affirmative action, this council would not only have to
act by a majority of its entire membership but also by a majority of
each of the two subdivisions.4 5 Many variations on this theme have
been proposed during the negotiations," but the basic dispute is not
so much as to which council structure or regime will be adopted as
to whether this will be the approach taken at all.
Although the composition issue is of vital importance to the future operation of the international seabed organization, the rules
under which the resources will be allocated are of equal significance.
b.

Regime

Assuming some acceptable compromise can be reached concerning the nature of the international authority to govern exploitation of non-living resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
it will be necessary to develop some approach to the promulgation of
rules and regulations concerning activities to be conducted in the
area. There are two basic approaches which might be taken - the
"constitutive" and the "substantive." The constitutive approach
-

45. Draft United Nations Convention on the International Seabed Area, U.N.
Doc. AIAC. 138/25, arts. 36, 38, Appendix E.
46. For an analysis of various proposals for the governing body of an international
seabed authority, see Sohn, The Council of an InternationalSea-Bed Authority, 9 SAN
DIEGo L. REv. 404 (1972).
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would be to establish procedures for rule making and then leave the
promulgation of the actual rules and regulations themselves up to the
international authority consistent with the established procedure.
The substantive approach would be to attempt to develop in the
Third Conference all of the rules and regulations to be applicable to
deep seabed marine mining activities and include these in the treaty
or append them thereto as annexes. The constitutive approach has
the merit of flexibility and adaptability while the substantive approach could result in ill-conceived rules and regulations and a later
inability to modify those rules and regulations in response, to new
technological or other developments. Nonetheless, it is not likely that
the states involved would be willing to give up the rule making power
exclusively to an international authority and accordingly some blend
of the two approaches is most likely to emerge from the Third Conference.
There are three issues which seem to be of principal importance
in the minds of the negotiators at the present time concerning the
regime to govern deep seabed mining: (1) the method of allocation of
rights; (2) operating rules and regulations; and (3) production controls.
As to the method of allocating rights, there is a marked divergence of attitude between the developed nations and the developing
countries. The latters' viewpoint has been most forcefully expressed
by Latin American nations who have proposed what has become
known as the "enterprise" concept. This approach would establish
the Enterprise as the operating arm of the authority exclusively empowered to undertake all technical, industrial, or commercial activities relating to the exploration of the seabed and the exploitation of
its resources either through service contracts or joint ventures with
companies or states. 7 The United States and other developed countries prefer a licensing system to the international agency monopoly
approach suggested in the Latin American draft. Those nations supporting the licensing system take the position that the essential element of any resource management system consists in guaranteed
access to ocean resources under reasonable conditions.4s A middle
course suggested by both Canada and Australia would include the
enterprise concept but would also permit the international authority
47. Working Paperon the Regime for the Sea Bed and Ocean Floorand Its Subsoil
Beyond the Limits of NationalJurisdiction,U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/49 ch. III, § 3 (1971);
see also Texts IllustratingAreas of Agreement and Disagreementat 107, note 34 supra.
48. See Statement by Ambassador John R. Stevenson before the Subcommittee
on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels, of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs (93d Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 19, 1973) at 10.
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to issue licenses for exploitation directly to states or companies.
The United States has taken a strong position in opposition to
the enterprise concept. In a statement made on August 10, 1972, the
head of the U. S. delegation to the Seabed Committee stated:
[W]e believe it is important to dispel any possible misconceptions that my Government would agree to a monopoly by an
international operating agency over deep seabed exploitation
41i

The second issue relates to the operating rules and regulations
and here again the question concerns the nature of the origin of the
rules and regulations. Developed nations generally prefer the use of
specialized commissions or other technical bodies for the development and submission of rules and regulations, with final approval to
be given by the policy making organ of the agency. The United
States, for example, has recommended the creation of a Rules and
Recommended Practices Commission which would propose rules and
practices to the Council of the seabed agency for adoption. 5
The third issue, that of production controls, appears to be of
critical importance. Some developing countries are dependent to a
great extent on one or two mineral exports for their economic livelihood. It was suggested at an early date that the mining of deep seabed
minerals could result in increased supplies which would depress
prices for these exports, thus injuring the economic base of these
nations. At the request of the Seabed Committee5 the United Nations Secretariat undertook a study of the issue which was published
in 1971.52 Although the potential economic impacts do not appear to
be as widespread or severe as some had imagined, there is nonetheless
evidence of possible adverse economic effects stemming from seabed
mining. Thus it is not surprising to find that there have been several
proposals put forth in the negotiations to grant the international
seabed authority power to control or limit production of seabed minerals. These proposals range from those which would only accord
49. Statement by John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee at 63, note 40
supra.
50. Draft United Nations Convention on the International Sea Bed, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/25 arts. 67-68 (1970); see also Texts Illustrating Areas of Agreement and
Disagreement at 128, note 34 supra.
51. G.A. Res. 2750-A (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224 (1971).
52. See Possible Impact of Sea-Bed Mineral Productionin the Area Beyond National Jurisdictionon World Markets, with Special Reference to the Problems of Developing Countries: A Preliminary Assessment, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/36 (1971);
Additional Notes on the Possible Economic Implications of Mineral Productionfrom
the InternationalSea-Bed Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/73 (1972).
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recommendatory power to the seabed agency, to those which would
authorize reduction of production or the fixing of price levels. The
United States and other developed nations have taken the position
that the authority
should not have any powers in the area of produc3
tion controls.
c.

ProvisionalEntry into Force

One of the major concerns expressed by the United States
deep sea mining industry has been that the delays occasioned by the
law of the sea negotiations and the time necessary for subsequent
ratification of any international agreement arrived at during the Caracas conference may result in the imposition of economic hardships
and loss of competitive standing. Some companies have indicated
that they are ready at the present time to begin prospecting operations but are reluctant to commit the requisite capital until they
know the parameters of the seabed regime under which they will be
operating.54 As a result, the United States proposed during the
March, 1973, meeting of the Seabed Committee that a study be made
by the United Nations Secretariat concerning the possibility of provisional entry into force of the draft articles on the seabed regime
following the adoption and authentification of the text at the Caracas
meeting.5 The study by the Secretariat indicated a number of precedents for such provisional entry, 56 and it therefore seems likely not
only that this approach will be taken with respect to the seabed
regime but also for other aspects of the law of the sea treaty thus
making the new rules applicable from the conclusion of the 1974-75
Conference rather than waiting several years pending deposit of the
requisite number of ratifications.57
d. National Legislation to Authorize Seabed Mining
Activities
Mineral industry representatives in several countries have
53. Statement by Ambassador John R. Stevenson before the Subcommittee on
Minerals, Materials, and Fuels at 10, note 48 supra.
54. See statement of John E. Flipse at 13, note 41 supra.
55. The Seabed Committee recommended that such a study be made. See

Recommendation of Sub-Committee I Adopted at its 66th Meeting held on 27 March
1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.I/L.20 (1973).

56. See Examples of Precedents of ProvisionalApplication, Pending their Entry
into Force, of MultilateralTreaties, Especially Treaties which have EstablishedInternational Organizations and/or Regimes, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/88 (1973).
57. The four 1958 law of the sea agreements, notes 10-13, supra, required passage
of an average of six years each from adoption to entry into force.
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indicated a desire to proceed on a unilateral basis with deep seabed
mining activities. Bills were introduced in the Ninety-Second Congress 5 and reintroduced in the Ninety-Third Congress" which would,
through reciprocal national legislation, create a system, administered
by each participating nation only with respect to its own nationals,
permitting exploration for and exploitation of seabed minerals. Although it is undeniable that the mere introduction of such bills and
the strong support therefor evidenced by the domestic mining industry"5 gave impetus to more progressive action in developing an international seabed regime in the Seabed Committee, their passage could
easily prejudice current negotiations by encouraging unilateral responses from developing coastal states with respect to near shore
resources.' In testimony delivered on March 1, 1973, before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee, the United States Government took a position in opposition to enactment of such bills until such time as either (1) it becomes
clear that unsatisfactory progress is being made toward adoption of
an international seabed regime in the current negotiations, or (2) the
Third Conference has concluded without taking appropriate action
on the subject.2
Many developing countries have been disturbed by the initia58. S. 2801, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972); H.R. 13904, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
See Hearings on Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources (H.R. 13904) before the Subcommittee on Oceanographyof the House Committee on Merchant Marineand Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 32 (1972); and Hearings on S. 2801 before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materialsand Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). No action was taken by either subcommittee on
the bills during the ninety-second session of Congress.
59. S. 1134 and H.R. 9, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) are identical in language to
their predecessors in the Ninety-Second Congress. See Hearingson S. 1134 before the
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materialsand Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
60. For an exposition of the industry view, see Humphreys, An International
Regime for the Exploration for and Exploitation of the Resources of the Deep Seabed
- The United States Hard Mineral Industry Position, 5 NATURAL REs. LAWYER 731
(1972).
61. For divergent views of these seabed mining bills and their potential impact
on the law of the sea negotiations, see Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act - A Negative View, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 446 (1973); Laylin, The Law to
Govern Deepsea Mining Until Superseded by InternationalAgreement, 10 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 433 (1973).
62. Statement of Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State,
and Acting Chairman, Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries; Supplemental Statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, Director for Ocean Resources,
Department of the Interior, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., March 1, 1973.
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tives of the mining industries and the United States Congress in the
proposed legislation, fearing that it might result in a monopoly by
technologically developed nations on the benefits to be derived from
the exploitation of seabed mineral resources. Obviously, whether unilateral exploitation is undertaken now or whether these companies
work within the framework of an international regime later, the benefits will accrue to a greater or lesser degree to those companies and
nations possessing the requisite technology. Nonetheless, the international approach can ensure some equitable sharing of royalties or
other economic benefits among developing nations and can also ensure protection of other international community interests which
might not be adequately secured through the unilateral approach.
Given the United States Government's March 1, 1973, testimony
however, it appears that the question is moot in this country at least
through the conclusion of the Caracas segment of the Third Conference in August, 1974. The future of the United States legislation will
ultimately depend upon the degree of progress made toward the development of a seabed regime at the Caracas meeting.
B.

Living Resources

Unlike the situation of the regime to govern exploitation of
seabed minerals beyond national jurisdiction, the subject of high seas
fisheries is not a de novo issue, but rather one in which there has been
development of both industry practice and international law for
hundreds of years. Although this state of affairs makes the issues
more obvious and specific, it also results in an inertial force against
radical departure from the existing regime.
The present state of high seas fisheries is characterized by steadily reduced stocks of fish and increased international conflicts stemming from problems of access to fishery resources. Both problems
have their roots in the open access character of fisheries which itself
stems from the classical concept of freedom of the high seas. Since
no individual or nation has the right under the doctrine to appropriate areas of the high seas, there is no jurisdictional base from which
management or other regulatory activities can take place.13 The absence of regulation has resulted in overfishing, gear congestion, and
biologic and economic waste. There have been several attempts in the
past to ameliorate these problems. One approach has been for the
nations involved in fishing a particular geographical area or particu63. See F.

CHRISTY AND

A. Scorr,

THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES

chs.

2, 9 (1965); Christy, Fishery Problems and the US. Draft Article, in PROCEEDINGS:
FOURTH NATIONAL SEA GRANT CONFERENCE 200 (Katzel, et. al., eds. 1972).
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lar species or stock of fish to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning the conservation and allocation of the resources.
These agreements have established fishery commissions of varying
dimensions and with varying degrees of authority, but by and large
the prevailing national (vis-a-vis international) interests coupled
with a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms has resulted in these
agreements being of limited utility in conserving fishery resources."
A second approach has been for coastal states to extend their
exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to substantial distances from the coast
in order to provide a single respository of management authority. 5 It
is generally conceded today that state practice in this regard has
probably ripened into a rule of customary international law permitting extension of exclusive fisheries zones to a distance of twelve
nautical miles from the coast. More troublesome have been the
claims of 50, 100, and 200 miles breadth for such zones. These unilateral claims - i.e. those probably not sanctioned by present international law - have resulted in serious conflicts in many instances.
Most notable of these conflicts have been those between Iceland and
the United Kingdom concerning the former's extension of her fishery
zones over a period of years since 1958,66 and the dispute between the
United States, on the one hand, and Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, on
the other hand, concerning the latters' 200 mile claims in the South
Pacific. 7
In viewing the present fisheries problem, one must be aware of
two sets of conditions. The first relates to the resources in question.
Different species of fish have differing migratory characteristics
which may in some cases dictate the need for different management
regimes. The living resources of the sea fall into four basic categories
according to their migratory habits - coastal, highly migratory, anadromous, and sedentary. Coastal species are those which migrate in
the water off the coasts of one or more nations but which do not enter
fresh or estuarine waters and which do not have worldwide or transo64. See Report on Regulatory Fishery Bodies, F.A. 0. Fisheries Circular No. 138
(1972), U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/64 (1972); CARROZ AND ROCHE, The International Policing
of High Seas Fisheries, 6 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 61 (1968); Koers, The Enforcement of
International FisheriesAgreements, 1 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1970).
65. See Comment, 44 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1968); Teclaff, JurisdictionOver Offshore Fisheries-HowFar Into the High Seas, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 409 (1967).
66. See Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic FisheriesDispute, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 37; Katz,
Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 83 (1973).
67. See Lecuona, The Ecuador Fisheries Dispute: A New Approach to an Old
Problem, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMM. 91 (1970); Loring, United States-Peruvian"Fisheries" Dispute, 23 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1971); Smetherman and Smetherman, The CEP
Claims, U.S. Tuna Fishing and Inter-American Relations, 14 ORas 951 (1970-71).
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ceanic migratory characteristics. Highly migratory oceanic fishes are
characterized by extremely broad distribution and large-scale, often
transoceanic, migrations, the prime example being the tunas. 8 Anadromous species are those which require a fresh-water environment for
their spawning, egg incubation, and, in most cases, the rearing of
juveniles, and upon the marine environment for the majority of their
growth and maturation. Among anadromous species are the Pacific
and Atlantic salmons, trouts, shads, stripped bass, smelts, and
sturgeons. 9 Sedentary species are those which at the harvestable
stage either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to
move except in constant physical contact with it.70
The second set of conditions concerns the diverse national interests in fishery activities. Some nations have highly developed fishery
fleets and processing facilities, while others rank the fishing industry
low on their scale of national priorities. 7' The degree of investment
- whether utilizing private or public funds - naturally has an impact on the force with which positions on fishery problems are argued
in the negotiations. Further, some nations concentrate their fishing
effort off their own coasts, while others have constructed large flotillas which roam the world ocean in search of living resources. 7 This
dichotomy, too, results in polarization of positions on fishery issues.
With these biologic and national interest factors in mind, it is
appropriate to divide the proposals on fisheries made in the preparatory meetings for the Third Conference into three categories - the
proposal for management on a "species" basis, the proposals of distant water fishing nations, and the proposals for broad coastal state
jurisdiction.
The "species" approach is most forcefully articulated by the
United States. In short, it seeks to apply management systems on a
species-by-species basis, the systems being geared to the particular
biologic characteristics of the species in question. The original United
States fishery proposal, Article III of the draft treaty articles submitted to the Seabed Committee at its July-August, 1971 meeting, 3 had
68. See Special Considerations Regarding the Management of Anadromous
Fisheries and Highly Migratory Oceanic Fishes: Working Paper Submitted by the
United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/.20 at 5 (1973).
69. Id. at 2.
70. Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 2(4), note 12 supra.
71. See Johnson, Trends in World and Domestic Fisheries, 97 U.S. NAy. INST.

PRoc. 25 (June, 1971); C. NIGHTINGALE, EXPLOITING THE OCEANS (1968).
72. See Iguchi, A View of a Distant-waterFishing State-Japan,THE
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73. Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries
Submitted by the United States, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 (1971).
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provided essentially for management on a stock rather than on a
zonal basis. However, emphasis was placed in Article III on the use
of regional and international organizations for the management of
fisheries. In recognition of the trend toward a 200 mile economic
resource zone, the United States has revised its fisheries position,
submitting a working paper on the subject to the July-August, 1972,
meeting of the Seabed Committee. 4 The basic elements of the United
States position are as follows:
(a) Coastal states are to have regulatory (conservation) authority
over and preferential catch rights to all coastal species off their
coasts, to the limits of their migratory range. The same principle is
applicable to anadromous species, with the preference going to the
state in whose fresh waters they spawn.
(b) Coastal states are obligated to provide access for other states
to any portion of such resources not fully utilized by the coastal state,
with appropriate priorities to states which have traditionally fished
the resource or states in the region, including landlocked states.
(c) Coastal and anadromous resources which are located in or
migrate through waters adjacent to more than one coastal state are
to be regulated by agreement among the affected states. The revised
proposal contains sections on enforcement and dispute settlement to
provide the framework for this cooperative process.
(d) Highly migratory oceanic resources are to be regulated by
international fishery organizations.
The "species" approach has not received wide support to this
point in the negotiations, in part due to the appealing simplicity of
the economic resource zone concept.
Distant water fishing nations are generally opposed to the extension of broad exclusive fisheries zones or coastal state preferences, for
their fleets range far and wide on the world ocean in search of concentrations of fish found principally in waters above the world's continental shelves and thus within the 200 mile limit often proposed for
such zones. Both Japan and the Soviet Union, leading distant water
fishing states, have submitted draft articles to the Seabed Committee
on the subject of international fisheries management.
The Japanese articles provide preferential rights to developing
coastal states to the extent of their catch capacity, and a preferential
right for developed states to the extent necessary for the maintenance
of its "locally conducted small-scale coastal fishery." Excluded from
the preferential rights concept are anadromous species and highly
74. United States Revised Draft FisheriesArticle, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.19
(1973).
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migratory species of fish which are to be regulated pursuant to international or regional arrangements. Dispute settlement provisions
ensure that regulatory measures imposed by the coastal states take
into consideration the interests of other states concerned, an obvious
reference to distant water fleets. In the words of the proposal, Japan
seeks
to ensure that a gradual accommodation of interests can be
brought about in the expanding exploitation and use of fishery
resources of the high seas, without causing any abrupt change in
the present order in fishing which might result in disturbing the
economic and social structure of States."
The Soviet Union articles would permit a developing coastal
state to reserve annually that part of the allowable catch of fish which
could be taken by that state. The articles would also permit any
coastal state to reserve annually that part of allowable catch of anadromous species spawned in its rivers which can be harvested by that
state. Any uncaught stock, up to maximum sustainable yield, would
then be open to distant water fishing fleets. Where no international
agreements exist concerning regulatory measures for fisheries, the
Soviet Union articles would permit coastal states to establish such
regulatory measures "on the basis of scientific findings" and "in
agreement with the states also engaged in fishing in the said areas."
Finally, the articles contain a provision which takes into consideration the growth of the fishing capability of the developing coastal
states with respect to increasing the allowable catch allocated to that
coastal state."6
A number of proposals concerning broad coastal state jurisdiction over living marine resources have been introduced in the Seabed
Committee." The concept common to all of these proposals is that
coastal states should have exclusive or preferential rights to all living
and non-living resources in a maritime zone adjacent to their coasts
extending no more than 200 nautical miles from the coastline. The
bases for this concept are that the coastal state has a vital economic
75. Proposals for a Regime of Fisherieson the High Seas: Submitted by Japan,

U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.ll/L.12 at 1 (1972).
76. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Article on Fishing, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.6 (1972).
77. See, e.g., Draft Articles for Inclusion in a Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Working Paper Submitted by the Delegations of Ecuador, Panama and Peru, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.138/SC.ITIL.27 (1973); Working Paper on Sea Area Within the Limits of
National Jurisdiction Submitted by the Chinese Delegation, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.34 (1973); Draft Articles on Fisheriesby Canada,India, Keyna, and
Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC/.II/L.38 (1973).
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interest in the resources of its adjacent maritime areas, and that these
resources constitute part of the patrimony or national wealth of the
coastal state. This being the case, it follows that the coastal state
should have the exclusive (or at least preferential) jurisdictional
rights with respect to the exploitation of these resources.
In spite of the seemingly overwhelming support for the economic
resource zone concept, there are a number of issues which remain for
agreement. For example, how will highly migratory and anadromous
species be treated within the zonal approach? It seems probable that
coastal state competence with respect to fisheries would not include
highly migratory species such as tuna and whales, but that those
species would be subject to some form of international management.
It also seems likely that if an economic resource zone concept were
adopted, anadromous species would be included in the coastal state
competence because of the special relationship between the fish stock
and the coastal state.
On the issue of limits, the 200 mile maximum appears to be a
very likely element of such a regime, but less certainty exists concerning the criteria which the coastal state will be authorized to use in
delimiting its economic zone. So far the suggestions have been so
general as to offer little guidance - economic, geological, biological,
and similar factors are enunciated without elaboration. It seems extremely unlikely, however, that any coastal state would assert jurisdiction over less than the 200 miles permitted, and that the outcome
will almost certainly be delimitation by the vast majority (if not all)
of coastal states of economic zones to a distance of 200 miles from the
coastline.
Another issue is whether coastal state rights with respect to fishery resources will be exclusive or simply preferential. If these rights
are exclusive, then the coastal state would be under no obligation to
afford other members of the international community access to the
fish stocks in question. Thus the stocks could be underutilized or not
exploited at all, in the discretion of the coastal state. Under a system
of preferential rights, however, the coastal state would have what
would amount to a right of first refusal with respect to the allowable
catch from the stock. If it did not take up to the maximum sustainable yield, it would then be under an obligation to permit other members of the international community to have access on reasonable
terms to the remaining stock. The conditions of entry might well
involve license fees and would certainly involve compliance with regulations concerning the maximum sustainable yield, the use of certain types of gear, and the like.
This then is the framework in which the Third Conference will
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operate on the fishery question. The most desirable object, of course,
would be to design a regime which would most efficiently use the
resources available, while avoiding sudden economic dislocation
caused by jurisdictional arrangements differing from those now in
force. In view of the varying biologic habits of fish, and the diverse
national interests involved, it seems problematical that this goal will
be achieved in its entirety.
C.

TerritorialSea Breadth; Navigation

The breadth of the territorial sea - that belt of ocean space over
which the coastal state exercises near absolute sovereignty - has
been a bone of contention throughout the development of the law of
the sea. Closely related to the question of the breadth of the territorial
sea has been the question of the nature of the rights of navigation in
territorial waters by vessels flying the flag of a state other than that
of the coastal nation. Problems concerning the right of transit
through straits used for international navigation where the same constitute territorial waters have been particularly acute.
1.

The Breadth of the TerritorialSea

The breadth of the territorial sea has never been the subject of
an international agreement. Indeed, most authorities are of the opinion that there has never been any customary international law rule
concerning the maximum breadth of the territorial sea. For a period
of time during the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries all of
the major maritime powers of the world claimed only three nautical
miles as the breadth of the territorial sea. However, beginning in the
Twentieth century, the claims became more diverse. Although in
1958 a majority of nations still claimed three miles as the proper
breadth of the territorial sea, at the present time no single breadth
can claim a majority of states as adherents. 8
For reasons related primarily to fisheries rather than national
security, there has been a trend toward a breadth of twelve miles for
the territorial sea during the past ten to twenty years. At present 35
states claim three or four miles, 67 claim six to twelve miles, and 16
78. On the territorial sea breadth issue in general, see S. SWARZTRAUBER, THE
THREE-MILE LiMrr OF TERRrrORIAL SEAS (1972); Heinzen, Three Mile Limit: Preserving
the Freedom of the Seas, 11 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1959); Meade, The Great Territorial
Sea Squabble, 95 U. S. NAy. INST. PROC., 45 (April, 1969); McDougal and Burke, The
Community Interest in a Narrow TerritorialSea: Inclusive Versus Exclusive Competence Over the Oceans, 45 CORNELL L. Q. 171 (1960).
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claim in excess Of twelve miles."9
It is not therefore surprising to find that agreement on a maximum twelve mile breadth for the territorial sea will probably be easy
to secure at the Third Conference provided that the resource and
other interests of coastal states can be accommodated in other areas.
If broad coastal state jurisdiction over living and non-living resources
can be secured through adoption of some such concept as the economic resource zone, then there is little reason to assert absolute
sovereignty over a maritime belt greater than twelve miles. Indeed,
it is probably logical to limit the territorial sea breadth to three miles
or even two or one considering the relative uselessness of such narrow
limits from the standpoint of national security. Nonetheless the concept of the twelve mile territorial sea seems firmly ingrained in the
positions of the states negotiating in the current law of the sea deliberations and it is most likely to be the outcome of the Third Conference.80
2.

Navigation in TerritorialWaters
a.

The TerritorialSea

The traditional international law rule concerning navigation
within the territorial sea of another state has been one of "innocent
passage."'" Innocent passage is defined as passage which is not prejudicial to the "peace, good order or security of the coastal State." 2
There is no international law definition of what is meant by the latter
phrase nor has there been sufficient state practice to establish customary international law rules concerning it."3 The test of innocence
is thus subjective and is to be applied by the coastal state in its sole
discretion. This subjectivity and national discretion have led some
79. Data taken from U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURIS(Int'l Boundary Study, Series A Limits in the Sea, No. 36, 1st rev., March 1,
1973).
80. On the United States position and some additional issues, see Knight, The
1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea and Passage
Through International Straits, 51 ORE. L. REv. 759, 763-769 (1972).
81. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Arts. 14-23, note
11 supra.
82. Id., art. 14(4).
83. The Corfu Channel Case, [19491 I.C.J. 4, did hold that: "[it is . . . generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in time of
peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal
State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through
straits in time of peace." Id. at 28.
DICTIONS

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34

nations to criticize the concept and express the fear that coastal
states might impose unreasonable burdens on international commerce by categorizing, for political, military, or economic reasons,
certain types of passage as not innocent. However, where the passage
is for the purpose of importing goods to or exporting goods from a
coastal state, it seems unlikely that the coastal state would interfere
with its own well being in terms of participation in international
trade and commerce. Thus it is probable that "innocent passage" will
remain the international law standard in territorial waters. A different set of problems arises where territorial waters encompass international straits which vessels seek to transit without involving themselves with the ports of the adjacent coastal states.
b.

Straits

The straits issue has become one of the major focal points
of the current international law of the sea deliberations. The United
States first raised the issue in its proposal for a regime of passage
which would approximate the right of freedom of navigation on the
high seas provided that the transit of the territorial straits was solely
for the purpose of getting from one side to the other." A number of
states vehemently opposed this proposal, most notably the archipelago states of Malaysia and Indonesia, and the nation which sits astride the straits of Gibraltar, Spain."5 The contentions of these states
were twofold, namely that the free transit regime would not provide
the coastal state adequate assurances with respect to protection of its
beaches from pollution, and that it would not provide the coastal
state adequate protection from the possible adverse effects of military
conflicts occurring between the superpowers during transit. The
United States responded to these criticisms by proposing a system of
absolute liability for pollution when transiting international straits,"
but has continued to insist on an agreement according the rights of
submerged passage and overflight, rights which do not now appertain
in international law. 87
84. Draft Articles on the Breadth of the TerritorialSea, Straits, and Fisheries
Submitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 art. II
(1971).
85. For typical reactions; see the excerpts quoted in Knight, at 774-79, note 80
supra.
86. See statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed
Committee, July 28, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.37 at 2 (1972).
87. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides in
art. 14(6) that "[slubmarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show their
flag" when exercising the right of innocent passage through territorial waters.
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A group of developing nations submitted a counterproposal on
straits passage during the March, 1973, meeting of the United Nations Seabed Committee." That proposal, which would give great
discretion and authority to coastal states with respect to vessels navigating near their shores, is entirely inconsistent with the approach
taken by the major maritime powers and has thus polarized the forces
on each side of the issue. To further exacerbate the problem, the
United States has stated that the issue of straits is a non-negotiable
one and that there cannot be a successful law of the sea conference
without the accommodation of the interests set forth in the United
States proposal. 5
Thus the fate of the entire Third Conference may well hinge on
the ability of states to negotiate an acceptable compromise from
among the radically divergent approaches suggested so far on the
issue of passage through international straits.
D. Pollution
Pollution of man's environment is an all-encompassing subject
cutting across every facet of activity on the face of the Earth. Merely
contemplating the world-wide adjustments necessary to maintain a
reasonable quality of the Earth's environment is an awesome task. It
is not surprising then to find that the Seabed Committee, in its
preparatory work for the Third Conference, has sought to rigidly limit
the scope of its work to keep it within the confines of the Third
Conference agenda. It has been decided for example, that the subject
of land-based pollution as well as a good deal of the international law
concerning air and water pollution would not be considered by the
Third Conference but that these items would be left to the work of
the recently established United Nations Environmental Program2 °
The Third Conference will, however, address itself to two basic
sources of pollution of the oceans: (1) pollution produced in the process of exploiting the non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil;
88. Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Spain and
Yemen: Draft Articles on Navigation Through the TerritorialSea Including Straits
Used for InternationalNavigation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.18 (1973).
89. Statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee, August 3, 1971; summary in U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IISR.4-23 at 47 (1971).
The critical nature of the issue for the United States was reiterated during 1972 and
1973; see Statement of John R. Stevenson before the Seabed Committee, August 10,
1972, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 382-83 (1972); and statement of John R. Stevenson before
Subcommittee II of the Seabed Committee, July 25, 1973, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.II/SR. 70 at 11 (1973).
90. See G. A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) (1972), 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 433 (1973).
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and (2) pollution introduced to the marine environment from deliberate and accidental vessel discharges.
I.

Seabed Source Pollution

Seabed source pollution - limited at this point in time to the
exploration for and exploitation of petroleum, natural gas, and sulphur deposits - actually constitutes only two percent of all pollutants introduced in the ocean annually and only five percent of maritime sources, vessels accounting for the other 95 percent.9 Nonetheless, seabed pollutants are usually introduced in near-shore, populated areas where the impact is much more direct and obvious than
the greater amounts of pollution gradually accumulating in midoceanic areas. Thus, though the percentage is small, the impact is
large and it is therefore not surprising to find that the vast majority
of developed nations support strict safeguards to prevent pollution of
the ocean and the adjacent beaches from fossil fuel exploitation activities. There are several proposals suggesting rules and regulations to
govern exploitation beyond the limits of national jurisdiction which
would impose reasonably strict pollution prevention requirements.
Further, within the framework of the economic resource zone concept
each coastal state would be given the right to adopt standards as
strict as it wishes for the protection of its own coasts. A more difficult
question arises concerning the establishment of minimum international standards for the protection of the marine environment which
would be applicable equally to the seabed area within the economic
resource zone and the area beyond.
The reason for the problem is that many developing countries are
not as enthusiastic about the concept of pollution prevention as are
developed countries. They correctly and astutely observe that most
industrialized countries achieved their level of technological superiority at no small cost to their environments and only now, in their years
of affluence, are in a position to afford consideration of such factors
as environmental quality. The developing countries have yet to use
(or abuse) their environment to produce the standard of living extant
in western Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia. They
therefore argue that the suggestions concerning restrictions of industrial development for purposes of protecting the marine environment are, whether willfully or unintentionally, directed at reducing
the growth opportunities for developing countries. Such countries
91. Competence to Establish Standards for the Control of Vessel Source Pollution: Working Paper Presented by the United States of America, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/SC.III/L.36 at 2 (1973).
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have intimated that they would accept such restrictions only if the
developed nations were willing to subsidize the costs involved so that
they (the developing nations) could proceed with industrial development apace.
2.

Vessel Sources Pollution

The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
("IMCO") has been engaged in attempts to reduce or restrict the
discharge of pollutants from vessels for many years. However, many
developing nations have charged - and perhaps not incorrectly that IMCO has by and large been the tool of the major maritime
powers and its efforts at pollution prevention have been token at best.
It was such a reaction to the unwillingness or inability of IMCO to
move rapidly in the Arctic pollution situation that led Canada to take
unilateral action by way of a 100 mile pollution prevention zone in
which the construction and operation of ships is strictly regulated,
ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the fragile Arctic environment. 2 Nonetheless, developments have proceeded at IMCO, most
recently resulting in adoption of the text of the International Conven3
tion for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973.1
The Seabed Committee has also placed the question of vessel
source pollution on its agenda and there have been a number of
proposals in this area. As with other issues involved in the negotiations, the issue no longer appears to be whether to retain absolute
freedom of the high seas as opposed to establishment of jurisdictional
bases for management, but rather the nature of the jurisdictional
base. Major maritime powers are generally opposed to zonal approaches to jurisdiction - whether in regard to fisheries jurisdiction,
vessel pollution control, or regulation of scientific research - while
most developing nations perceive that their national interests can
best be protected through establishment of broad offshore zones of
national jurisdiction. The situation is particularly acute with respect
to the pollution issue, where the potential for imposition of excessive
cost burdens on maritime transport is great if each coastal state
should be free to establish its own pollution standards within a 200
92. See Beesley, Rights and Responsibilities of Arctic CoastalStates: The Canadian View, 3 J. MARITIME L. & COMM. 1 (1971); Bilder, The CanadianArctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 Micti. L. REV. 1
(1970).
93. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973:
Text of the Articles of the Convention as Adopted by the Conference, IMCO Doc.
MP/CONF/WP. 35 (1973).
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mile zone. This situation would not be unlike that which would exist
if trucks traveling from Maine to California were required to have a
different type of pollution control device operative in each state
through which they passed - the costs of acquiring thirteen or fourteen different devices, plus the time expended in changing them at
each state boundary, would greatly raise the cost to the consumer of
the goods being transported.
The most comprehensive and sophisticated vessel pollution proposal is that of the United States. The United States proposal envisions a combination flag state-port state-coastal state regulatory system which, in the- words of the United States representative to the
Seabed Committee when the United States draft articles on pollution
were tabled, provides that:
The flag State would continue to have enforcement responsibilities over its vessels, although such authority would not be
exclusive, and would assume a specific obligation to enforce international standards in the case of vessels flying its flag, subject
to the right of other States to have recourse to compulsory dispute
settlement procedures to ensure that the obligation was fully discharged.
The port state would be able to enforce pollution control
standards in the case of vessels using its ports, regardless of where
violations took place.
The coastal state would have rights and remedies that would
fully protect its environmental interests; provision was made for
dealing with the four major marine pollution problems facing a
coastal state: serious maritime casualties off its coasts, violations
of international standards presenting imminent danger of major
harmful consequences, persistent and unreasonable failure of a
State to enforce the international standards with respect to vessels flying its flag, and general violations of the standards. 4
The United States' fear - indeed that of most major maritime powers - is that extensive pollution zones might be abused to adversely
affect maritime commerce. Of course, developing nations probably
import proportionately more goods by ocean borne transport than do
developed nations, yet the potential for disruption of maritime commerce as an outgrowth of a non-ocean related controversy remains.
The United States, in August, 1973, delivered a statement to the
Seabed Committee pointing out that the majority of coastal nations
94. Statement of John Norton Moore before Subcommittee III of the Seabed
Committee, July 18, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR. 41 at 4 (1973).
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of the world are "zone locked," i.e., vessels bound from their ports to
areas beyond any 200 mile economic resource zone would of necessity
pass through the economic resource zone (and, if the zonal approach
were taken, the pollution control zone) of at least one other nation."5
If pollution control zones were used to inhibit maritime transport, the
effect would obviously be felt not only by the United States and other
maritime powers, but by the majority of the world's coastal nations.
Thus the form which pollution control agreements take concerning
appropriate jurisdiction to promulgate and enforce rules may well be
of greater importance than the substantive rules themselves.
E.

Scientific Research

The issue of freedom of scientific research is one, like fisheries,
which has been before the international community for some time.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf adopted in 1958 contains a
provision concerning scientific research involving research on the continental shelf. That provision states that:
The consent of the coastal state shall be obtained in respect of
any research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken
there. Nevertheless, the coastal state shall not normally withhold
its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution
with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the
proviso that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires,
to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in any
event the results shall be published."
Presumably, then, scientific research concerning the high seas beyond the limits of territorial waters is unrestricted as is research
involving the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of continental
shelf jurisdiction. However, a number of states which have unilaterally adopted extensive fishery zones or territorial seas have also reserved the right to require compliance with national rules and regulations concerning the conduct of scientific research and, in some cases,
have denied ocean scientists the right of access to extensive zones of
ocean space. 7
95. Statement by John Norton Moore before the Seabed Committee, August 13,
1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.100 at 7 (1973).
96. Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 5(8), note 12 supra.
97. Background material on this issue can be found in the following articles: W.
Burke, Marine Science Research and International Law (Occasional Paper No. 8, Law
of the Sea Institute Sept., 1970); Clingan, Scientific Inquiry in the Oceans: Legal
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Once again the problem turns on the differing perspectives of
developed and developing nations. Developed nations with the potential to convert raw scientific data into economic benefit or military
power tend to favor removal of all limitations on scientific research
in the oceans, including those now present with respect to the continental shelf."' Developing nations perceive, rightly or wrongly, that
completely unrestrained and unregulated scientific research only
promises to widen the economic gap between developed and developing nations, principally because the latter do not possess the technical skills or industrial wherewithal to gain from such data even should
it be provided to them by the developed nations' research institutes.
The United States proposal, typical of that of technologically
advanced nations, would reverse the burden of proof from the regime
of Article 5(8) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf by permitting research to proceed in economic resource zones after expiration
of a notice period, provided that certain assurances are given and
certain conditions concerning the conduct of the expedition observed.
The only power of the coastal state (in addition, of course, to being
able to compel adherence to the assurances and conditions) is to have
representation in the research venture. Contrary to this approach is
the very succinct and very nationalistic proposal of a group of developing nations which provides:
Whenever, according to this Convention, the consent of a
coastal State is requested for undertaking marine scientific research in the areas under its sovereignty and national jurisdiction
the explicit consent of that State shall be obtained before such
activity is undertaken. 9
Similarly, a proposal sponsored by five Latin American nations contains in its first operative paragraph the following provision:
The coastal State shall have the right to bring under regulation
scientific research activities conducted in the zone subject to its
Regulation and Responsibility, 6 LEX ET SCIENTIA 77 (1969); Knauss, Development of
the Freedom of Scientific Research Issue of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 1
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 93 (1973).

98. See, e.g., Statement of John Albers before Subcommittee III of the Seabed
Committee, March 22, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR. 33-39 at 2; and statement
of Philip Handler before Subcommittee III of the Seabed Committee, March 29, 1973,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/SR. 33-39 at 50 (1973).
99. Algiers, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Somalia, Trinidadand Tobago, Tunisia, Yugoslavia: Draft Article on
Consent to Conduct Marine Scientific Research, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.55

(1973). (Emphasis added.)
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maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction.'100
The outcome of the Third Conference will thus have an important
impact on the conduct of oceanographic research, with the nature of
the impact depending primarily on whether a restrictive or a liberal
attitude is taken toward the conduct of such research within any
economic resource zones legitimized by the Conference.

IV.

CONCLUSION-A

COMMENT ON PROCEDURE AND

SOME LIKELY

OUTCOMES

As this article was being prepared, the Third Conference opened
with a procedural session in New York City. This session, extending
from December 3 to December 14, 1973, concerned itself exclusively
with the procedures to be utilized when the substantive conference
opens in Caracas on June 20, 1974. Probably the single most important procedural item discussed was the matter of voting procedure for
adoption of treaty articles.
In the past, it has been the general practice of such conventions
to divide into committees and subcommittees to handle the separate
items on the agenda with a majority of votes sufficing to adopt draft
treaty articles at the subcommittee or committee level. In the plenary
session, a two-thirds majority has been required to adopt draft treaty
articles by the conference as a whole.' 0 ' The law of the sea negotiations and Third Conference preparatory work have been marked from
their inception by a divergence from the past practice of voting on
each issue as it arose. Because all nations perceived the necessity for
universal or near-universal acceptance of the treaty articles emanating from the Third Conference, a "consensus" system has been
adopted for the deliberations of the Seabed Committee in its preparatory work. Actual votes have been few and have usually amounted to
no more than a formal endorsement of what had been agreed to by
consensus through informal negotiations. Votes on critical issues have
been avoided almost entirely, and it is therefore not surprising to find
strong support for continuation of this consensus approach at least
until the final plenary vote at the Third Conference. The consensus
system has a number of advantages. First, it keeps all the parties
100. Scientific Research within the Zone Subject to the Sovereignty and Jurisdiction of the Coastal State, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.III/L.45 (1973).
101. The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties [U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27
(1969), 8 Int'l Legal Materials 679 (1969); not yet in force] provides in article 9(2) that:
"The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the
vote of two-thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the same majority they
shall decide to apply a different rule."
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negotiating and does not isolate one nation or group of nations on any
particular issue, thereby polarizing the parties. Second, it has the
virtue of ensuring an agreement which will be acceptable to all and
thereby achieving the universality or near universality required of a
global law of the sea treaty.
These advantages, however, contain inherent weaknesses. First,
consensus tends to produce a lowest common denominator end product, for by the process of consensus one ultimately arrives at something which is really fully acceptable to no one yet which does not
impair the critical national interests of anyone. Such an agreement
is apt to be the product of political bargaining rather than a response
to technological, biological, and economic facts of life. Nonetheless,
many feel it is better to have some agreement which is generally
honored than to continue with the existing system. Precisely what
procedure will be established cannot be known at this moment but
will, of course, be decided before the Third Conference opens its first
substantive session in Caracas.
Although the final outcome of the Third Conference will not be
known until the summer, 1974, and perhaps not even until 1975, a
general trend in favor of broad, exclusive national zones of jurisdiction in the sea is clearly discernable. If this is in fact the outcome, it
will be a disappointment to the many persons who have labored over
the past six years to establish a meaningful international regime for
the use of ocean space. Yet if the new regime avoids the national
conflict and resource waste characterizing the use of ocean space for
the past three decades, it will permit a generation of stability in ocean
affairs which could be the foundation on which a new international
order would be constructed at the turn of the century.
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UNITED NATIONS: SEABED COMMITTEE LIST OF SUBJECTS AND ISSUES
TO BE DISCUSSED AT LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
[August 16, 19721
List of Subjects and Issues Relating to
The Law of the Sea
1. International Regime for the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond National
Jurisdiction
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.

Territorial Sea
2.1
2.2
2.3

2.4
2.5
3.

Innocent Passage
Other Related Matters Including the Question of the Right of Transit

Continental Shelf
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6

6.

Nature and Characteristics
Limits
Rights of Coastal States with Regard to National Security, Customs and
Fiscal Control, Sanitation and Immigration Regulations

Straits Used for International Navigation
4.1
4.2

5.

Nature and Characteristics, Including the Question of the Unity or Plurality of Regimes in the Territorial Sea
Historic Waters
Limits
2.3.1 Question of the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea: Various Aspects
Involved
2.3.2 Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Global or Regional Criteria, Open
Seas and Oceans, Semi-Enclosed Seas and Enclosed Seas
Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea
Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Resulting from the Question of Plurality of Regimes in the Territorial Sea

Contiguous Zone
3.1
3.2
3.3

4.

Nature and Characteristics
International Machinery: Structure, Functions, Powers
Economic Implications
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Bearing in Mind the Special Interests and
Needs of the Developing Countries, Whether Coastal or Landlocked
Definition and Limits of the Area
Use Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes

Nature and Scope of the Sovereign Rights of Coastal States Over the Continental Shelf. Duties of States
Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf: Applicable Criteria
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